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Daniel Bodansky’s The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law is a valuable 
scholarly work that offers the reader a journey into the complexities of contemporary 
international environmental law. One of the advantages of writing a review that is part of a 
dedicated volume is that I do not have to give an account of the whole book, but can focus on 
those to which I have more to say, hoping that the other contributors to this volume will fill 
the gap. 
The book carves a unique path in international environmental law literature. First, it does 
not seek to offer a comprehensive survey of international environmental law, but rather to 
examine the "processes through which international environmental law is developed, 
implemented, and enforced.”1 Second, the book was written with a stronger methodological 
and philosophical outlook than is typical of introductory works. It is, in other words, a 
theoretically motivated work.  
 My critique of the book highlights what, in my mind, is a significant blind-spot of the 
book: the increasingly important role of private transnational environmental regulation 
("PTER") in the contemporary field of global environmental governance. A book that is 
seeking to unfold the dynamic of international environmental law should, I will argue, be 
interested not only in the art and craft of treaty-making, but also in the craftsmanship of 
rule-making as it takes place within global organizations such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative, the International Organization for Standardization, the Forest Stewardship 
Council ("FSC") and the Marine Stewardship Council. Further, as the universe of PTER is 
 
1. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011). 
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growing in both its influence and in its scale, studying the linkages between this universe and 
the classic domain of public international law is becoming a critical policy question. What are 
the potential synergies or dis-complementarities between the two domains? To what extent 
normative developments within the PTER domain can support or facilitate normative 
processes within the treaty domain (and vice-versa). Further, reflecting on the linkages 
between these domains also requires us to deal directly with some of the theoretical questions 
that lie at the core of the book, such as the meaning of law in the international realm, the 
distinction between soft law and hard law, and the mechanisms of compliance.   
I.  Setting the Scene: The Emergence of Private Transnational 
Environmental Regulation as a New Source of Global Ordering 
Over the last several years, the environmental regulation system has undergone radical 
changes. Various private normative schemes, including voluntary corporate codes,2 
environmental management systems,3 “green label” schemes,4 environmental reporting 
standards,5 green financial schemes and green indexes,6 have taken an increasingly 
important role in the environmental regulatory field.7 The emergence of private 
environmental schemes with global reach has changed the nature of the private governance 
field. Once a field that was highly fragmented and consisted of uncoordinated organizational 
routines and segregated contractual arrangements, PTER has turned into a much more 
ordered domain, dominated by several centers of global governance. This change influenced 
all the facets of the governance game — from the norm-production process to implementation 
and enforcement. Further, these emerging regimes developed highly specified and articulated 
legal schemes, supported by intricate institutional structures.8 As such, the new regimes 
 
2. See, e.g., OECD Guidelines of Multinational Enterprise, OECDILIBRARY (Sept. 29, 2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf. 
3. For examples of management systems, see ISO 14001, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=31807; EU 
EMAS Regulations, No 1221/2009 of Nov. 25, 2009,  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009R1221:EN:NOT; & 
Responsible Care program, available at http://www.icca-chem.org/en/Home/Responsible-care/. 
4. For examples of “green label” schemes, see FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL UNITED STATES, 
http://www.fscus.org/ (last visited May 20, 2012); & About Certification, ENERGY STAR, 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=cbd_guidebook.cbd_guidebook_apply_3, (last visited May 20, 
2012). 
5. For examples of environmental reporting standards, see Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI), 
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, available at https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1-
Guidelines-Incl-Technical-Protocol.pdf; & AA1000 Assurance Standard, available at 
http://www.accountability.org/standards/aa1000as/index.html.  
6. Green financial schemes include codes regulating lending practices and “ethical” investment 
standards. For examples of green indexes, see DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY INDEXES 
http://www.sustainability-index.com/ (last visited May 20, 2012), & FTSE4Good Index Series, FTSE 
INDEX COMPANY, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/index.jsp (last visited May 
20, 2012). 
7. Some of the foregoing instruments, such as the GRI, also cover non-environmental issues. There are 
similar instruments covering other aspects of the corporate responsibility issue, such as the SA8000 
standard, dealing with human rights of workers. Social Accountability 8000, SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, (2008) http://www.sa-intl.org/.   
8. Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private 
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differ from some of the first-generation global codes, which lacked both the extensive 
specificity and the intricate institutional fabric that characterize their second-generation 
successors.9 The increasing importance of private environmental schemes can be linked to the 
rise of regulatory capitalism as the predominant form of capitalism at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.10  
 It is beyond the scope of this brief paper to examine in detail these varied regimes. The 
table below outlines some of the leading PTER schemes. As can be seen from the table, the 
schemes differ in their style and scope. They include both general standards that seek to 
regulate the rule-making process itself, meta-regulatory norms seeking to regulate 
institutional processes at the firm level (e.g., environmental self-management, environmental 
disclosure), and substantive standards that regulate specific environmental policy domains 
(relating to production methods or product components).11  What is common to these 
examples is that they all have an elaborated normative structure, supported by a developed 
institutional framework.12 
  
 
Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 297 (2007); see also Benjamin 
Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State 
Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. 
POL’Y, ADMIN, INST. 503 (2002); see also Tim Buthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A 
(P)Review, 12 BUS. & POL. 1 (2010). 
9. Two good examples of first-generation codes are The Ceres Principles, CERES 
http://www.ceres.org/about-us/our-history/ceres-principles (last visited May 21, 2012); Global 
Sullivan Principles, THE LEON H. SULLIVAN FOUNDATION, 
http://thesullivanfoundation.org/about/global-sullivan-principles. 
10. David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as a Networked Order: The International System as an 
Informational Network, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52 (2005); John Braithwaite, 
Neoliberalism or Regulatory Capitalism, REGNET OCCASIONAL PAPER 5 (2005), available at 
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/nontaxpubs/ROP5.pdf. 
11. For a discussion of meta-regulation, see John Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive 
Regulation for Tax System Integrity, 25 LAW & POL’Y 1 (2003). 
12. For further discussion of PTER schemes, see Klaus Dingwerth & Philipp Pattberg World Politics 
and Organizational Fields: The Case of Transnational Sustainability Governance. 15 EUR. J.  INT’L 
REL. 707 (2009), available at http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/15/4.toc; see also Buthe, supra note 8. 
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Table 1: The Universe of Global Private Environmental Ordering (Partial Picture) 
Regulatory 
Category 
Field of 
Intervention 
The Legal 
Instrument 
Responsible 
Organization 
Compliance 
Mechanisms 
Meta-
regulation of 
standard 
setting 
Transnational 
Standard- 
Setting  
ISEAL Code of 
Good 
Practice for 
Setting Social 
and 
Environmental 
Standards, 
Vol. 5 
ISEAL Alliance Independent Evaluation 
Mechanism 
(http://www.isealalliance.
org/resources/p049-
independent-evaluation-
mechanism-procedure)  
Meta-
regulation of 
corporate 
governance 
(Process 
based 
intervention) 
Environmental 
Management 
ISO 14001, 
Responsible 
Care 
International 
Organization for 
Standardization, 
International 
Council of 
Chemical 
Associations 
(ICCA), 
Private external 
verification (relatively 
robust in the case of ISO 
14001) 
 Sustainability 
Reporting  
GRI 
Guidelines 
Global Reporting 
Initiative 
GRI (documents check), 
Private External 
Assurance (based on 
global rules) 
 Assurance 
Practices 
ISAE 3000, 
AA1000 
Assurance 
Standard  
 
The International 
Auditing and 
Assurance 
Standards Board; 
AccountAbility 
None 
Specific 
Intervention 
     
 General CSR 
Guidelines 
Global 
Compact  
UN led Transparency based 
 Green 
Labeling 
(product & 
process 
oriented) 
Forest 
Stewardship 
Council global 
label; SA8000 
(social 
accountability 
standard); 
FairTrade 
International 
Standards 
Forest 
Stewardship 
Council; Social 
Accountability 
International; 
FairTrade 
International 
Independent certification 
bodies accredited by the 
Forest Stewardship 
Council; SAAS (in the 
case of SA8000) and FLO-
CERT GmbH (in the case 
of FairTrade 
International, 
http://www.flo-cert.net/flo-
cert/)  
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 Sustainability 
Indexes 
FTSE4Good, 
Dow Jones 
Sustainability 
Index ("DJSI") 
FTSE, Dow Jones Private compliance 
governed by FTSE and 
Dow Jones and drawing 
on external consultants 
(Eiris & SAM) 
 Environmental 
Impact 
Assessment 
Equator 
Principles13 
Joint Governance 
by Participating 
Banks 
Voluntary reporting 
mechanism 
(http://www.equator-
principles.com/reporting.s
html) 
II.  Private Transnational Environmental Regulation ("PTER") as a 
Reflexive Network 
Over the past five years the PTER field has reached a turning point, which has 
transformed it from a highly fragmented domain into a reflexive network that exhibits 
increasing capacity for introspection, coordination and cross-regime synergy.  Consider first, 
the issue of reflexivity. A prerequisite for the emergence of such reflexivity is the 
intensification of ties among the network elements (density).14 Indeed, within the PTER it is 
possible to find multiple links and cross-sensitivities between the distinct regimes that are 
part of the network. Thus, for example, The GRI Guidelines refer to external standards, by 
requiring organizations to list all the external economic, environmental, and social codes to 
which they subscribe, including any environment-related performance or certification 
system.15 The FTSE4Good Inclusion Criteria state that high-impact companies with ISO or 
EMAS certification are considered to meet several core indicators, which are required from 
such companies; such firms are also subject to stricter disclosure requirements.16  
The intensification of the ties between the network nods does not suffice, however, for the 
emergence of network reflexivity. The communicative interaction between the network 
elements has to take a dialogical form, which is not hierarchical. The idea of network 
reflexivity refers, therefore, to reciprocal communicative processes through which the 
elements of the network refer to each other in a way that involves complex epistemic and 
normative judgement, and continuously challenges the network structure.17 Three prominent 
 
13.  There are close links between the Equator Principles and the GRI Financial Services Sector 
Supplement. See OECD, supra note 2 (procedures for assessing and screening environmental and 
social risks in business lines). 
14. Following Marwell and Oliver, I define density as the number of actual social ties in a collective 
divided by the number possible. See Gerald Marwell, Pamela E. Oliver, & Ralph Prahl, Social 
Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. III., 94 AM. J. SOC. 502, 505 (1988). 
15. Global Reporting Initiative, supra note 4, at 23, 27. 
16. FTSE4Good Index Series Inclusion Criteria, at 3, FTSE INDEX COMPANY (2006), available at 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads/FTSE4Good_Inclusion_Criteria.p
df.  
17. For example, in terms of the structure and weight of the links between the network elements and 
the centrality of different elements within the structure see Alain Barrat et al., The Architecture of 
Complex Weighted Networks, at 3747, PNAS, March 16, 2004, available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/101/11/3747.full.pdf+html; see also Steven  H. Strogatz,  Exploring 
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examples for the emergence of this kind of reflexivity within the contemporary PTER field are 
ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards (representing 
an attempt to regulate the global standard-setting process), the International Standard ISO 
26000:2010, Guidance on social responsibility (representing an attempt to develop an 
international consensus on what social responsibility ("SR") means and the SR issues that 
organizations need to address) and Accountability AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement 
Standard (a general mechanism to achieve the stakeholder requirements of various global 
standards, such as GRI, ISO 26000 and others).18 These three examples were not just the 
culmination of a reflexive dialogue, but would also serve as the basis for continued reflexive 
interaction within the network in the future.  
Another feature of reflexive networks is the emergence of coordination dynamics. The 
foregoing three standards also represent a form of emerging coordination. Another reflection 
of the coordination dynamic in the PTER field is the emergence of structured sites for 
conversation between network elements. Examples include joint forums such as the 
European Multi-Stakeholder Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility chaired by the EU 
Commission and the ISEAL Alliance and the UN Global Compact Network,19 long-term 
contractual arrangements such as the Memorandum of Understanding between ISO and GRI 
which was signed on September 2011,20 and the emergence of transnational associations such 
as the International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF) and CSR Europe.21  
A third feature of the emerging field of private environmental governance concerns its 
ensemble regulatory structure.22 This ensemble structure characterizes, in particular, the 
corporate social responsibility ("CSR") universe. By ensemble regulation, I refer to a collection 
of autonomous regulatory schemes that form a regulatory network, clustering around a 
common core of basic principles and exhibiting positive enforcement and normative 
externalities. The notion of positive enforcement externalities refers to the way in which 
compliance mechanisms of each regime also serve as an enforcement agent of the other 
 
Complex Networks, NATURE, March 8, 2001, at 268. 
18. See ISEAL Code of Good Practice, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/code (last visited 
May 21, 2012); ISO 26000 – Social Responsibility, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/social_responsibility/sr
_iso26000_overview.htm (last visited May 21, 2012);   AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement Standard, 
ACCOUNTABILITY  http://www.accountability.org/standards/aa1000ses/index.html (last visited May 
21, 2012).   
19. European Multi-Stakeholder Forum, available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/empl/csr_eu_multi_stakeholder_forum/info/data/en/csr%20ems%20forum.h
tm; UN Global Compact Participants, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last visited May 12, 
2012). 
20. ISO and Global Reporting Initiative Increase Cooperation on Sustainable Development, GLOBAL 
REPORTING, (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-
center/Pages/ISO-and-Global-Reporting-Initiative-increase-cooperation-on-sustainable-
development.aspx. 
21. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEADERS FORUM, http://www.iblf.org/; CSR EUROPE, 
http://www.csreurope.org/. 
22. See Oren Perez, Private Environmental Governance as Ensemble Regulation: A Critical Exploration 
of Sustainability Indexes and the New Ensemble Politics, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 543 
(2011). 
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regimes in the network, generating an amplified compliance effect. The meaning of this effect 
is that firms entering into the world of CSR are finding it increasingly more difficult to reap 
the reputational gains associated with voluntary CSR codes without undertaking real 
organizational efforts. Once a firm starts to publish environmental reports drawing on the 
GRI guidelines, adopts a certified EMS (ISO 14001 or Responsible Care), and enters the 
reputable list of either FTSE4Good or DJSI, it becomes increasingly more difficult for this 
firm to renege on its multidimensional commitments. Therefore, ensemble regulation makes 
it much more difficult to maintain a schizophrenic decoupling between the organization’s 
stated policies and its (actual) internal culture.23  
But the ensemble structure of this new private order has another, more subtle effect. 
There is positive feedback between the multi-focal invocation of the idea of sustainability 
across the ensemble, the normative standing of the idea as a moral-political principle, and the 
moral legitimacy of the ensemble and each of its constituent regimes. The mutual 
engagement with the concept of sustainability through the distinct regime-spaces and the 
normative cross-reference it facilitates is thus a source of positive normative externality. 
The emergence of this kind of positive network externality is not a necessary consequence 
of the evolution of PTER.  The fact that these various schemes all operate within a common 
subject-matter domain — environmental regulation — is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for the emergence of ensemble regulatory structure.24 I can offer two tentative 
observations in this context. First, the idea of sustainable development provided the network 
regimes with a focal ideological point, giving more room for cross-network collaboration.25 A 
second point concerns the institutional characteristics of this regulatory ensemble. First, the 
non-statal nature of the transnational institutions involved in this network has allowed them 
to transcend the national frictions that tend to haunt treaty-based regimes.26 Second, the fact 
that the distinct regimes composing the ensemble have evolved in a non-imperialistic fashion, 
each capturing a different segment of the CSR universe, has reduced the competitive tensions 
between the institutions, thereby facilitating the emergence of a synergic structure. 
Unfolding the structure of the PTER field as a reflexive network requires further 
theoretical and empirical work, but there are strong indications that this field has indeed 
reached a structural tipping point, which changed its underlying dynamic.27 
 
23. See Oren Perez, Between Soft Law and Greenwash: The Compliance Dynamic of Civil Forms of 
Environmental Regulation, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (D. Levi-Faur & Edward 
Elgar ed., 2011). 
24. A good counterexample is the field of international trade law, in which the proliferation of bilateral 
free-trade treaties poses an increasing risk to the WTO multilateral framework. See Jayant Menon, 
Dealing with the Proliferation of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, 32(10) WORLD ECONOMY 1381 
(2009). 
25. See Nils Ringe, Policy Preference Formation in Legislative Politics: Structures, Actors, and Focal 
Points, 49(4) AM. J. POL. SCI. 731 (2005). 
26. For example of the frictions that underlie the trade and climate change regimes, see James Scott & 
Rorden Wilkinson, What Happened to Doha in Geneva? Re-engineering the WTO's Image While 
Missing Key Opportunities, 22 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 141 (2010); John Whalley & Sean Walsh, Bringing 
the Copenhagen Global Climate Change Negotiations to Conclusion, 55(2) CESIFO ECON. STUD 255 
(2009). 
27. See Perez, supra note 22, at 548; KELSO, J.A. SCOTT & DAVID A. ENGSTROM, THE COMPLEMENTARY 
NATURE  6-14 (The MIT Press, 2006); Andrew Pilny & Michelle Shumate, Hyperlinks as Extensions 
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III. PTER In the "The Art and Craft of International Environmental 
Law": Reflections and Critique 
Bodansky recognizes the fact that private transnational regulation and private social 
agents (businesses, NGOs, experts) are taking an important role in the contemporary global 
governance system. However, his conceptual framework disregards the systemic aspects of 
this process, leading him to understate the significance of this phenomenon. Already in the 
preface to the book, Bodansky refers to private standards — "the sustainable fishery and 
forestry standards used by Wal-Mart and Home Depot" which were developed "more 
informally by environmental groups and business, and are applied to producers through 
supply-chain contracts, without any government involvement" — as an example of 
international environmental norm.28 He returns to this example later in the book when he 
enumerates the norms of international environmental law. In addition to intergovernmental 
agreements, decisions of treaty bodies, conference resolution and declarations, claims by 
states, and writings of legal scholars and experts, he similarly refers to business codes and 
conduct. The latter are defined as self-regulation efforts by business groups, sometimes in 
conjunction with environmental groups. He gives the example of the Marine Stewardship 
Council rules on sustainable fisheries (adopted by Wal-Mart). The development of these rules 
can be associated, he writes, with several motives: a wish to forestall intergovernmental 
regulation, reputation building or a genuine desire to improve the environment.29 
What is the legal status of private transnational environmental norms, in comparison to 
the classic instruments of public international law such as treaties or customary law? 
Bodansky seems inclined to the view that they represent either non-legal norms or soft law, 
given that "business codes of conduct are developed by non state actors, without any law 
making authority."30 This statement is somewhat relaxed in the pages that follow. Bodansky 
argues that what distinguishes hard law from soft law is the psychological state of mind of 
the relevant community: "Ultimately what makes a norm 'hard' is not that violations can be 
sanctioned, at least in the way that we ordinarily mean, or that norm can be applied by 
courts. Instead, what matters is the state of mind of the actors that comprise the relevant 
community – what we referred to earlier as the actor's internal point of view — a sense that 
the norm represents an obligation and that compliance is therefore required rather than 
optional."31 This definition seems to leave open the possibility that 'legal-like' private 
instruments, which have the mandatory quality of legal statements,32 could constitute "law" 
and lead to the emergence of legal communication. However, while Bodansky’s theoretical 
 
of Offline Instrumental Collective Action, 15(2) INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 260 (2012). 
28. BODANSKY, supra note 1. 
29. Id. at 96. 
30. Id. at 99. 
31. Id. at 101. 
32. Paul McNamara, Deontic Logic, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 103-04 (Edward N. 
Zalta ed. Summer 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/logic-
deontic/ (discussing how the mandatory quality of legal statements reflects their adherence to the 
deontic syntax, which is based on the following three basic forms: a prescriptive form (it is obligatory 
that), permissive form (it is permissible that) or prohibitive form (it is impermissible that)). 
Bodansky does not refer to literature of deontic logic).  
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framework seems open to that possibility, he rejects that possibility as a practical matter, as 
he states in various places that private regulatory instruments are "non-legal.” Indeed, in 
footnote 52 he states generally that he uses the term soft law to refer only to non-legal 
norms,33 and he later repeats that observation with reference to the specific example of ISO 
14000 environmental management series.34 
Despite the characterization of PTER as non-law Bodansky does not ignore the potential 
contribution of private standards, and more importantly private agents, in the advancement 
of environmental goals. He concludes chapter five (Varieties of Environmental Norms) by 
stating that international lawyers "can even pursue norm-making activities outside the 
intergovernmental process altogether, through private-standard setting. As a result, the 
question “what is law?” though still a favorite, has lost its prominence."35 
Bodansky provides further discussion of private players in chapter six (“Who's Who in the 
Legal Process”) in which he devotes several pages to NGOs and Business parties. 
International Environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace, WWF, FIELD, and World 
Resources Institute, play an important role, Bodansky argues, by mobilizing public opinion, 
by utilizing their expertise to advocate pro-environmental policies and by using their moral 
authority and data-gathering capacities to condemn ecologically adverse activities using 
blaming and shaming campaigns.36 Business, Bodansky argues, "contribute[s] significantly 
both to the creation and to the solution of environmental problems."37 In the context of our 
discussion of PTER, Bodansky notes that business groups participate directly in the 
standard-setting process and provide crucial technical expertise.38 He notes other examples of 
private standard-setting initiatives such as the Equator Principles (a framework for 
addressing environmental and social risks in project financing currently adopted by 73 
financial institutions) and the International Chamber of Commerce Business Charter for 
Sustainable Development.39  
Bodansky's approach to PTER seems lacking both in its conceptual structure and in its 
empirical grounding. Conceptually, Bodansky's discussion of the role of private codes and 
private agents seems incoherent. On the one hand he develops a psychological account of 
legal validity that emphasizes the state of mind of the actors that comprise the relevant 
community as the primary criterion for legal validity; on the other hand he seems committed 
to the view that sees PTER schemes as non-law.  One possible source for this inherent tension 
in his account is an implicit commitment to a binary distinction between soft law and hard 
law. Such commitment, however, disregards the possibility of conceptualising the idea of 
normativity as a fuzzy predicate that may be realised in degrees.40 “Softness” under this 
 
33. BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 99. 
34. Id. at 105. 
35. Id. at 107. 
36. Id. at 124-49. 
37. Id. at 130. 
38. Id. at 130-31. 
39. Id. at 134; EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com; Policy and Business Practices, 
INT’L CHAMBER OF COMM., http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/environment/id1309/index.html. 
40. Perez, supra note 22; Oren Perez, Law as a Strange Loop, BAR ILAN UNIV. PUB LAW Working Paper 
No. 01-10, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520969 (Dec. 9, 2009) in SOCIOLOGICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE – LIBER AMICORUM GUNTHER TEUBNER (Gralf-Peter Calliess et al. eds., Gruyter, 
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alternative conceptualisation does not designate a state of lawlessness, but a state of graded 
normativity, with differing levels of normative force. This interpretation invites us to 
understand normativity in terms of a continuum, which is closed by the ideal types of “non-
law” and “crisp (or absolute) law". The notion of fuzzy legality stipulates a legal universe in 
which legal norms do not possess the full force attributed to them in the ideal world of 
absolute legality. From a classic jurisprudential perspective the key for understanding the 
meaning of fuzzy legal norms lies in relaxing the assumption that legal norms provide 
content-independent reason for action, which cannot, in particular, be defeated by non-legal 
considerations. Relaxing this assumption would allow for the possibility that fuzzy norms 
(unlike ideal-type, 'Razian' legal norms) could be defeated by (some) non-legal reasons.41  
Empirically, Bodansky seems to underestimate the scope and scale of PTER as a social 
phenomenon. While, as noted above, Bodansky certainly acknowledges this phenomenon, and 
the role of private players in the international governance arena, he does not seem sensitive 
enough to the structural transformation that took place within the PTER domain and the 
enforcement and normative positive externalities associated with it.42 One reflection of this 
neglect is the way in which Bodansky analyzes PTER conceptually — under the heading of 
either NGOs or Business.43 This categorization disregards the institutional autonomy of 
many of the standard-setting organizations or networks that are involved in the process and 
the way they have created a new idiosyncratic field of action.44 This sociological neglect also 
means that his discussion cannot fully capture the policy potential of PTER, both 
independently and in connection with the more traditional instruments of international law.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
IV.  Concluding comments 
The increasing importance of PTER in the governance of global environmental dilemmas 
turns the question of the inter-linkages between the classic domain of public international 
law and PTER into an important policy issue. Of particular importance is the following 
question: to what extent do these two domains offer synergetic opportunities, or rather 
generate conflicting processes which may undermine the overall goal of pushing the global 
society into a more sustainable path? Consider for example the climate change domain. 
Parallel to the climate change convention and the  Kyoto Protocol, one can find a variety of 
private mechanisms that regulate diverse aspects of the climate change problematic. The 
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environmental chapter of the GRI Guidelines requires reporting corporations to disclose their 
"total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight”.45.  FTSE4Good Inclusion 
Criteria were expanded in January 2008 to include climate change criteria, which require 
firms in general to address their climate change impacts.46 Finally, the carbon offset market 
includes, alongside the compliance mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (the Joint 
Implementation and Clean Development Mechanisms),47 a variety of voluntary schemes, such 
as WWF Gold Standard and the Voluntary Carbon Standard.48 
Do these voluntary programs form a synergetic coupling with the climate change regime? 
One can offer competing hypotheses in this context, and it is far from trivial how to determine 
which is right empirically. The claim that there is strong potential synergy between the 
regimes draws on the governance deficit of the climate change regime and international 
environmental law in general (as discussed by Bodansky).49 PTER offers governance 
flexibility that is not available within the classic treaty regime. While it is true that firms 
cannot be compelled to join a particular PTER regime, once they enter into the voluntary 
green club there are multiple institutional mechanisms through which the regime can foster 
compliance, from disclosure to third-party verification and continuous engagement, drawing 
on normative, institutional and market incentives.50 The thesis that there is a positive 
complementarity between the public and private regimes is supported by various studies that 
demonstrate the efficacy of these regimes.51 The counter thesis argues that the emergence of 
PTER regimes should be understood as a strategic maneuver to counter more formal 
collective action. Thus, according to this story, the existence of private climate change regimes 
could support the opposition to the climate change negotiations. By creating a façade of 
regulatory activity, these regimes may forestall more formal (and efficient) regulatory 
intervention. While this story is not completely implausible, it seems to disregard the 
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formidable obstacles for concluding and implementing environmental treaties (such as free 
riding and lack of effective sanctioning) which Daniel Bodansky rightly points to.52 
Further, the skeptic camp also disregards a further form of synergy between the fields — a 
circular normative cross-support. The ensemble-like engagement with the climate change 
problematic can facilitate social-wide concern for the climate change problematic and 
legitimize further international action on this front. This could be particularly important as 
negotiations on the future of the Kyoto Protocol continue even after the 2011 meeting in 
Durban. 
Overall, the parallel universes of environmental treaties and PTER regimes generate a 
series of theoretical questions and practical challenges that clearly fall within the book’s main 
project: the examination of the "processes by which international environmental law is 
developed, implemented, and enforced."53 The fact that these questions are not resolved in 
this book does not detract from its value — the book is a great piece of legal scholarship, 
exposing the structural nuances of international environmental law in a theoretically 
complex fashion.  Rather this lacuna should be seen as an invitation for further scholarly 
work on these cardinal questions.    
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